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This is an interesting time in cross-border insolvency, certainly insofar as 
judicial cooperation at common law is concerned. There has been a patient, 
incremental and continuous development over the centuries since cases 
featuring foreign connexions first started appearing before the courts in 
England and Wales, mostly in the context of business insolvencies (of trading 
partnerships and, later, of commercial companies).1 As a result, the common 
law has made it possible to achieve a number of things to render assistance 
in cross-border matters and to make the task of administering a debtor’s 
estate easier across frontiers. Although the common law sourced much of its 
power to assist in the inherent jurisdiction of the courts, the developments in 
the case law have also been underpinned by principled approaches to comity, 
including reliance on theories of unity and universality as espoused by the 
judges. 
 
The first step in such cases was usually to recognise the existence of foreign 
proceedings and the office-holder’s capacity as representative of the estate 
and/or acting in the shoes of the debtor.2 In that light, recognition also 
followed naturally in relation to the office-holder’s title to assets and/or 
entitlement to pursue debts/claims owed to the estate.3 Where they deemed it 
desirable, the courts have also assisted in the procedural management of 
foreign proceedings by issuing orders requiring the examination of debtors or 
third parties as well as the production of any relevant documents within the 
jurisdiction.4 Taking the view, usually on grounds of unity and/or universality, 
that management of the debtor’s estate may be more appropriate in foreign 
proceedings, the courts have also assisted by restraining actions by creditors 
within the local jurisdiction where such actions would conflict with the proper 
administration of the estate elsewhere.5 Giving support to the idea of a single 
efficient insolvency procedure, the courts have also authorised stays or 
discharges of local proceedings.6 This is especially so where the courts view 
foreign proceedings as the natural home for the administration of the debtor’s 
estate.7 In this light, the courts have also mandated the remittance of funds for 
                                                 
1 Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 Hy. Bl. 131n; 126 ER 79; Sill v Worswick (1781) 1 H. Bl. 665. 
2 Idem; Macaulay v Guaranty Trust Company of New York (1927) 40 TLR 99. 
3 Bergerem v Marsh (1921) B&CR 195. 
4 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564. 
5 Re Vocalion (Foreign) Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 196. 
6 Re Queensland Mercantile Agency (1888) 58 LT 878. 
7 Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112. 
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the purposes of overseas proceedings8 and given effect to a reconstruction 
scheme voted on by the creditors in another jurisdiction.9  
 
Furthering the types of assistance developed at common law, the courts also 
developed at an early stage the doctrine of ancillary assistance. In the case of 
personal insolvencies, assistance was predicated on the basis of the principle 
of mobilia sequuntur personam,10 which largely meant that one set of 
bankruptcy proceedings would be organised, wherever the debtor was viewed 
to have taken up domicile. These would then recognised elsewhere, with all 
other courts assisting by the making of any necessary orders. In the case of 
corporate entities, however, adherence to the principle that the law of the 
state of incorporation also governed the dissolution of the company meant 
that only one court would usually have jurisdiction. This could be 
inconvenient, given that the debtor company might have business and 
activities elsewhere which needed careful management, ideally by means of a 
formal procedure. Courts thus evolved a principle, by which they enabled the 
opening of liquidations, termed “ancillary” or assisting, so as to deal with 
issues that could not simply be solved by the making of orders subsequent to 
recognition applications.11 Such ancillary liquidations were deemed to exist so 
as to assist foreign procedures and allowed for the full panoply of domestic 
law to come to the aid of the foreign office-holder. Care would be taken to 
ensure that domestic procedures would not come into conflict between the 
courts involved, while keeping costs down and ensuring that the interests of 
creditors were protected.12  
 
Ancillary liquidation has subsequently become regulated by statute, governing 
situations including where a dissolution has already taken place under the law 
of the home jurisdiction.13 These provisions were preceded in time, though, by 
specific assistance provisions enabling the communication of Letters of 
Request between British courts within the Empire for the granting of aid to one 
another.14 Together, the statutory framework they have made has allowed for 
the continued making of orders such as those mentioned above as well as the 
development of novelties. Thus, foreign office-holders have been permitted to 
bring vulnerable transaction actions under domestic law15 as well as to take 
proceedings against directors to recover a deficiency in the insolvent debtor’s 
assets.16 Furthermore, the judges have also been able to be creative under 
the umbrella of the statute, including by interpreting the assistance provisions 
to allow for the application of rescue proceedings to overseas companies, 
usually where their home jurisdiction did not have such proceedings at the 
                                                 
8 Re BCCI (No 10) [1997] Ch 213; Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited and 
Others [2008] UKHL 21. 
9 Re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch 385. 
10 Lit. “Moveables follow the person”. 
11 Re Matheson Brothers Ltd (1884) 27 Ch D 225. 
12 Re: Commercial Bank of South Australia (1886) 33 Ch D 174. 
13 Sections 221 and 225, Insolvency Act 1986 (United Kingdom). 
14 Ibid., section 426 (“section 426”). This provision is descended from one first adopted as 
section 220, Bankruptcy Act 1849 (England and Wales). In the form it took in the 1986 
enactment, the provision extends to both personal and corporate insolvencies. 
15 Re BCCI International (Overseas) Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 708. 
16 Re BCCI [1993] BCC 787. 
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time or where there would be a clear benefit in having United Kingdom rescue 
proceedings applied to the insolvent company.17  
 
In the modern age though, the emphasis has shifted to the creation of 
international frameworks for regulating insolvency matters. This is a process 
which has already led to the adoption of major texts, such as the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997 (“Model Law”) and the 
European Insolvency Regulation 2000 (“EIR”), although this does not by any 
means ensure global coverage in matters of cross-border insolvency. This is 
because the EIR is applicable only to member states of the European Union, 
while the Model Law has only been adopted by about twenty states around 
the world. As the texts were adopted in/made applicable to some common law 
states, they appear to have side-lined the common law as a source of 
developments in judicial cooperation, albeit section 426 (and its counterparts 
in other jurisdictions)18 has continued to generate a modest amount of 
decisions. The advent of the Privy Council case of Cambridge Gas19 
appearsappeared, nevertheless, to have given fresh impetus to judicial 
creativity. In the way it sought to reinvigorate the precept of “active 
assistance”, a methodology it traced back to early case-law from South 
Africa,20 the decision stated simply that a presumption of assistance should 
exist in furtherance of the principle of universality. This was subject only to 
two caveats: there not being any domestic statutory rule to the contrary and 
the requirement to positively avoid any harm to the creditors’ interests.  
 
Cambridge Gas was rapidly taken up as precedent in a number of cases 
across the common law world, including in Australia,21 Bermuda,22 the 
Cayman Islands,23 Ireland,24 Jersey25 and New Zealand.26 Unsurprisingly, 
given the overlap in membership between the Privy Council and the House of 
Lords,27 the lower courts in England and Wales also accepted the persuasive 
precedent in Cambridge Gas.28 Here too, one case went so far as to suggest 
it was desirable that the common law, whether in furtherance of judge-made 
cooperation or in decisions interpreting the extent of domestic cross-border 
                                                 
17 The earliest examples are: Re Dallhold Estates (UK) Pty Ltd [1992] BCC 394 
(administration for an Australian company and its subsidiary); Re Television Trade Rentals 
Ltd [2002] EWHC 211 (corporate voluntary arrangements for an Isle of Man company). 
18 Section 29, Bankruptcy Act 1966 and section 582, Corporations Act 2001 (Australia); Article 
49, Bankruptcy (Désastre) (Jersey) Law 1990 etc. 
19 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of 
Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26 (“Cambridge Gas”). 
20 Re African Farms Ltd [1906] TLR 373. 
21 Bank of Western Australia v Henderson (No 3) [2011] FMCA 840 (obiter). 
22 Re Founding Partners Global Fund Ltd (No 2) [2011] SC (Bda) 19 Com. 
23 Re Lancelot Investors Fund Ltd (2008) (unreported), cited in S. Dickson, “The Quick March 
of Modified Universalism: Rubin v Eurofinance SA” (Mourant Ozannes Briefing, June 2010). 
24 Fairfield Sentry Ltd (In Liquidation) & Anor v Citco Bank Nederland NV & Ors [2012] IEHC 
81. 
25 Re Montrow International Ltd 2007 JLR Note 40. 
26 Williams v Simpson Civ 2010-419-1174 (12 October 2010) (High Court, Hamilton). 
27 The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 transferred the House of Lords’ appellate judicial 
capacity to the newly formed United Kingdom Supreme Court. 
28 Rubin & Anor v Eurofinance SA & Ors [2010] EWCA Civ 895; New Cap Reinsurance Corp 
Ltd & Anor v Grant & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 971. 
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statutory provisions, should ensure that the same types of assistance were 
available in both systems.29 It seemed as if the common law had found, with 
Cambridge Gas, a new sense of purpose, particularly timely and useful, given 
the limitations on the applicability of the statutory frameworks that existed.  
 
As a result of case law heard before the Irish and United Kingdom Supreme 
Courts, Cambridge Gas has come came to be doubted as to its subject 
matter, which was the enforcement of a foreign judgement non-compliant with 
the traditional common law rules on jurisdiction in personam and in rem.30 Its 
insistence on “active assistance” continuescontinued, however, to find echoes 
in the jurisprudence. In 2013, an attempt in the Tambrook case to limit the 
assistance forthcoming under section 426 to only those situations where pre-
existing proceedings were afoot was rejected with the Cambridge Gas 
articulation of its principles receiving mention.31 “Active assistance” in that 
case was to be furthered by allowing for the “passporting” of a request for 
proceedings to be opened in the United Kingdom to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of effort in the home jurisdiction, which would only be purposeless 
and wasteful of effort and costs.32  
 
Furthermore, the line of jurisprudence inaugurated by Re Phoenix, itself 
reliant on Cambridge Gas, came to be applied in some Caribbean and North 
Atlantic jurisdictions. Re Phoenix was a case where assistance was provided 
at common law to extend a domestic statutory power to enable proceedings to 
be brought by the foreign office-holder within the jurisdiction. The judge held, 
simply, that the common law had long contained powers to recognise and 
assist foreign office-holders. In this context, assistance meant doing whatever 
the court could do in domestic proceedings. Furthermore, insolvency 
proceedings were about collective enforcement for the benefit of all creditors 
and included, the particular issue in the case, set aside proceedings directed 
at third parties, which the judge also held to be central to the purpose of 
insolvency proceedings.33 The 2013 decisions in the Cayman Islands34 and 
                                                 
29 Re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH, Schmitt v Deichmann & Ors [2012] EWHC 62 (Ch) (“Re 
Phoenix”). See, by this author, The Resurgence of Cross-Border Recognition and 
Enforcement of Insolvency Judgments: The Re Phoenix Case [2013] 9 ICCLR 329. 
30 Re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd (In Voluntary Liquidation) [2012] IESC 12; Conjoined Appeals in 
(1) Rubin & Anor v Eurofinance SA & Ors and (2) New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd & Anor v 
Grant and others [2012] UKSC 46 (“Rubin”). The latter also held Cambridge Gas to have 
been wrongly decided, a view that is was, even then, not without contention. See, by this 
author, An Irish Perspective on Insolvency Cooperation: The Re Flightlease Case (2013) 10 
ICR 158; The Limits of Co-Operation at Common Law: Rubin v Eurofinance in the Supreme 
Court (2013) 10 ICR 106. 
31 HSBC Bank v Tambrook Jersey Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 576 (22 May 2013) 
(“Tambrook”). See, by this author, Visa Denied: An End to the Jersey Practice of Insolvency 
“Passporting”? (2013) 17 JGLR 182; Passport Renewed: Extension of Rescue Proceedings to 
Foreign Companies under Section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (2013) 10 ICR 310. 
Together, the articles deal with the 3 hearings (1 in Jersey, 2 in the United Kingdom) in this 
case. 
32 Tambrook, at paragraph 39. 
33 Re Phoenix, at paragraph 62. 
34 Picard and Anor v Primeo Fund (In Official Liquidation) (unreported) (14 January 2013) 
(coram Jones J, sitting in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (Financial Services 
Division)) (“Primeo GC”). See, by this author, Après Rubin: le Déluge? Thoughts on the 
Future of Common Law Insolvency Cooperation (2013) 10 ICR 356. The author is grateful to 
 5 
Bermuda,35 which followed Re Phoenix, also signalled a desire to continue 
adherence to the cooperative precepts in Cambridge Gas, in the first case to 
allow the pursuit of transaction avoidance claims by the foreign office-holder, 
while, in the second, facilitating the summons of persons to be examined and 
to order the production of documents. The steps in either case were to be 
achieved by the extension of domestic statutory rules to a situation in which 
neither an ancillary nor a domestic liquidation were envisaged. Both cases 
also attempted a reconciliation between Cambridge Gas and Rubin, the 
judicial enthusiasm apparently being for the views expressed in the former. 
 
This apparent preference for the Cambridge Gas methodology, did not, 
however, remain without challenge. Both decisions were taken to appeal. In 
the decision first in time, handed down in November 2013, the Bermudian 
appellate court held the expansive views of the judge at first instance to be 
simply wrong.36 Although the appeal in the Cayman case was also heard in 
November, judgment did not appear till April 2014. By then, it had been 
overtaken by events, as the Bermudian case had been further appealed to the 
Privy Council, where it was heard at the end of on 29-30 April.37 As a result, in 
light of the Bermudian appeal, part of the Cayman judgment has been was 
reserved for a later date, pending the outcome of the Privy Council case.38 It 
is the unreserved part of the judgment, delivered in April 2014, which is the 
subject of the commentary in this article. 
 
The Facts in Primeo39 
 
The facts arose from the Madoff Ponzi scheme, which has generated some 
considerable litigation. The vehicle by which the investments were solicited 
was a company incorporated in New York and which was placed in liquidation 
on 15 December 2008. The plaintiff in the instant case was appointed trustee 
over the insolvent entity.40 On 5 February 2010, the Cayman court gave an 
order recognising the capacity of the plaintiff as the sole person entitled to act 
on behalf of the insolvent company. The court deemed that it had no 
jurisdiction to place the company into liquidation as it had no property in the 
islands, nor was it licensed to carry out business under the Securities 
                                                                                                                                            
Nicholas Fox, of Mourant Ozannes and Counsel in the case, for copies of both the first 
instance and appeal judgments. 
35 Re Saad Investments Company Ltd (In Official Liquidation) and Re Singularis Holdings Ltd 
(In Official Liquidation) [2013] SC Bda 28 Com (15 April 2013). See, by this author, The 
“Empire” Strikes Back: Lessons for the Mother Country in Insolvency Cooperation [2013] 11 
ICCLR 411. 
36 Re Saad Investments Company Ltd (In Official Liquidation) and Re Singularis Holdings Ltd 
(In Official Liquidation) [2013] CA (Bda) 7 Civ (18 November 2013). See, by this author, A 
Singular Tide in Insolvency Cooperation in Bermuda (2014) 11 ICR 159. 
37 On 29-30 April, in fact. At time of writing, judgment is still awaited. 
38 TheTwo related judgments hasve now appeared and is are reported as: PwC v Saad 
Investments Company Ltd [2014] UKPC 35 and Singularis Holdings Ltd v PwC [2014] UKPC 36 
(“Singularis PC”)(“Re Saad PC”). 
39 The account of the facts and first instance judgment that follows is largely excerpted from 
the commentary on the first instance decision, published as the article mentioned earlier, 
above note 34. 
40 Primeo GC, at paragraph 2. 
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Investment Business Law (2003 Revision).41 Its only connection with the 
islands was the fact that a number of funds, including the defendant in the 
instant case, had placed funds with it for investment. The defendant company 
was incorporated under Cayman law and licensed under the Mutual Funds 
Law (Law 13 of 1993). At first, between 1996 and 2007, the defendant 
invested directly in the insolvent company. Thereafter, it channelled 
investment funds it had withdrawn from the insolvent company via two further 
entities (incorporated in the Caymans and Bermuda) back into the company. 
Whether the investments were direct or indirect, the plaintiff maintained that 
the funds the defendant received and distributed to its own investors were 
wholly derived from the insolvent company and its illegal activities.42 
 
When Madoff was arrested in late 2008, the defendant company’s directors 
suspended any payments out and, on 23 January 2009, its sole shareholder 
filed for voluntary winding up, which was converted in April of that year into a 
winding up under court supervision.43 The substance of the plaintiff’s claim 
was that the moneys paid by the insolvent company could be recouped from 
the defendant company on the basis of transaction avoidance rules 
(fraudulent transfers and/or voidable preferences), whether under United 
States or Cayman law.44 The vehicle for this claim was the power the court 
had to it under the Cayman assistance statute45 or at common law. The 
defendant company asserted various rights in defence, including set off and 
other claims that would avoid or minimise its liability to make payment. 
 
The Judgement at First Instance 
 
The court set out, by its order of 19 January 2011, the following issues, inter 
alia, for determination:46  
 
(i) Assuming the plaintiff had available to it the claims under United States 
law it asserted, whether the Caymans court could assist by virtue of the 
domestic assistance provision by applying the foreign law to the 
matter? 
(ii) Assuming the plaintiff enjoyed a similar facility for claims under the 
domestic statute, whether the Caymans court could assist by using the 
same means in order to apply that domestic law to the fact situation?47 
 
The judge first referred to the fact that the Companies Law 1961 (Cap 22) was 
based on a blend of a Jamaican statute and the United Kingdom Companies 
                                                 
41 Ibid., at paragraph 3. 
42 Ibid., at paragraph 4. 
43 Ibid., at paragraph 5. 
44 Ibid., at paragraphs 6-7, referring to sections 547-548, Bankruptcy Code (United States) 
(90-day preferences and fraudulent transfers) and Article 10, New York Debtor and Creditor 
Law (fraudulent transfers); sections 168 or 145, Companies Law (2007 or 2010 Revision) 
(Cayman Islands) (voidable preferences). A fraudulent trading claim was dropped (at 
paragraph 8). 
45 Sections 241-242 of the Companies Law (2010 Revision). 
46 Primeo GC, at paragraph 9. 
47 The points were also put on the basis of powers argued as available (or not) to the judge at 
common law. 
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Act 1948. The winding up provisions were derived from the Jamaican text, 
which meant that it replicated the position in the United Kingdom Companies 
Act 1862. Thus it did not contain the provisions permitting liquidation of a 
foreign entity that were introduced into United Kingdom law in 1929.48 The 
Companies (Amendment) Law 2007 (in force 1 March 2009) introduced 
section 91(d) and sections 241-242.49 The judge then asserted that the 
provisions in Part XVII, including sections 241-242, were intended to partially 
codify the common law position with respect to ancillary liquidations in aid of a 
main liquidation occurring in the jurisdiction of incorporation, a position very 
different to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997 
position that would allow main proceedings to occur where the debtor had its 
centre of main interests, not necessarily where it was incorporated. He stated 
that the partial codification did not abolish the availability of the common law 
to come to the assistance of the foreign office-holder.  
 
In the instant case, the plaintiff had, under the recognition order, been given 
status as the sole recognised official capable of representing the insolvent 
company and bringing any causes of action it may have within the jurisdiction. 
The issue for the judge was whether the cooperation provisions in the statute 
                                                 
48 Ibid., at paragraph 10. These are the ancillary liquidation provisions now in sections 221 
and 225, Insolvency Act 1986 (United Kingdom). References below to sections of legislation, 
other than to sections 304 or 426, are to Cayman Islands legislation. 
49 Ibid., at paragraphs 11-12, the provisions being in Part XVII titled “International 
Cooperation”. These read as follows:  
“91. The Court has jurisdiction to make winding up orders in respect of- … 
(d) a foreign company which-  
(i) has property located in the Islands;  
(ii) is carrying on business in the Islands;  
(iii) is the general partner of a limited partnership; or  
(iv) is registered under Part IX [Companies incorporated outside the islands carrying on 
business within the islands]. 
241. (1) Upon the application of a foreign representative the Court may make orders ancillary 
to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding for the purposes of-  
(a) recognising the right of a foreign representative to act in the Islands on behalf of or in the 
name of a debtor;  
(b) enjoining the commencement or staying the continuation of legal proceedings against a 
debtor;  
(c) staying the enforcement of any judgment against a debtor;  
(d) requiring a person in possession of information relating to the business or affairs of a 
debtor to be examined by and produce documents to its foreign representative; and  
(e) ordering the turnover to a foreign representative of any property belonging to a debtor. 
242. (1) In determining whether to make an ancillary order under section 241, the Court shall 
be guided by matters which will best assure an economic and expeditious administration of 
the debtor's estate, consistent with- 
(a) the just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in a debtor's estate wherever 
they may be domiciled;  
(b) the protection of claim holders in the Islands against prejudice and inconvenience in the 
processing of claims in the foreign bankruptcy proceeding;  
(c) the prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property comprised in the 
debtor's estate;  
(d) the distribution of the debtor's estate amongst creditors substantially in accordance with 
the order prescribed by Part V [Winding up of companies and associations]; 
(e) the recognition and enforcement of security interests created by the debtor;  
(f) the non-enforcement of foreign taxes, fines and penalties; and  
(g) comity. …”. 
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or at common law would entitle the court to assist the plaintiff to do so.50 The 
defendant’s assertion was that the statute did not contemplate the bringing of 
transaction avoidance provisions within its remit as its enumeration of 
available relief was exhaustive, while the plaintiff’s was that the general 
purpose of the provision was to allow ancillary assistance with the examples 
of relief given not detracting from the court’s inherent power to assist. On the 
construction of the provision in section 241, the judge came to the view that 
the list was exhaustive.51 
 
As such, argument turned to whether the provision in paragraph (e) on the 
turnover of property belonging to the debtor could be read so as to include 
property to be recovered as a result of a transaction avoidance claim. The 
plaintiff’s view was that the nature and function of insolvency proceedings 
invariably included such a power and was reflected in the section 242(1)(c) 
mention of such transactions as legitimately motivating the court’s ability to 
offer ancillary assistance. Although the judge was surprised that the 
legislature chose not to make express such a fundamental component of any 
bankruptcy system in section 241,52 he was invited by the plaintiff to turn to 
the legislative history of the provision, particularly where the Law Commission 
Report stated that the provision was intended to “codify” the law and was to 
be based on American provisions with which local practitioners were familiar, 
an oblique reference to the former section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code 
(“section 304”), since replaced by Chapter 15 of the same code incorporating 
the Model Law.53 The judge noted that the legislature, in carrying out the 
codification of the common law rules, did look to a model akin to section 304. 
It did so, perhaps deliberately, so as not to either choose the Model Law or 
indeed the United Kingdom’s section 426, particular since, in the case of the 
latter, it would also have required necessitated the designation of countries 
eligible for cooperation. Nonetheless, the judge made the point that the 
codification of the common law rules must still be taken to mean that the court 
retained a discretion to assist, even where the foreign proceedings met the 
criterion of proceedings capable of recognition and the substantive law of the 
foreign proceedings was consistent with Cayman Islands public policy.54  
 
The plaintiff’s case was that the reference to section 304 enabled the judge to 
have regard to case law in the United States with respect to its workings, 
citation being made of Re Metzeler,55 where the American court applied 
foreign (German) law to the recovery of preferential and/or fraudulent 
transfers and where “property” of the estate was defined to mean property 
recovered by such claims. The judge was not persuaded that the legislature, 
in being inspired by the general model offered by section 304, also intended 
that the words of the codification should be given technical meanings in line 
with prevailing United States jurisprudence.56 In any event, there was a 
                                                 
50 Ibid., at paragraph 13. 
51 Ibid., at paragraph 14. 
52 Ibid., at paragraph 15. 
53 Ibid., at paragraph 16. 
54 Ibid., at paragraph 17. 
55 Re Metzeler 78 BR 674 (Bankr SDNY 1987). 
56 Primeo GC, at paragraph 18. 
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conceptual difference between the words actually used “property of the 
debtor” and “property of the estate”, the former being that in the debtor’s 
possession at the time proceedings are opened, while the latter refers to the 
property available for distribution to creditors, swelled, as it may be, by the 
fruits of transaction avoidance claims.57 Referring to the often factually 
complex issues raised by such claims, the judge was of the view that Part 
XVII, in furnishing a procedural mechanism for obtaining ancillary relief, was 
not designed for establishing the merit of claims that would be better 
determined in proceedings commenced by writ. As such, he concluded that 
section 241 did not enable him to offer the plaintiff the remedy that he 
sought.58  
 
On the question, however, of what law would apply, had this relief been 
available,59 the judge came to the conclusion that the local law would apply. 
He did not accept the plaintiff’s contention that the use of the word ancillary 
meant that the focus was on assistance to foreign proceedings using foreign 
law, as the availability of section 241 was predicated on the court not having 
jurisdiction under section 91(d) and under which proceedings would take 
place under local law with presumably the application of local provisions.60 
Furthermore, the judge did not accept the assertion that logic required the 
application of the same law to transaction avoidance claims as distributions, 
since the common law did not contemplate this position and the legislature did 
not make it express that this needed to be the case,61 nor did he agree with 
the argument based on a requirement for consistency, under which the 
references in section 242(1)(c) to transaction avoidance and to the debtor’s 
property must be taken to refer to transactions under a foreign law and 
property as defined by that law.  
 
The judge’s view was that the ancillary assistance provisions did not create 
parallel territorial proceedings, but simply provided for assistance to foreign 
proceedings consonant with Cayman Islands public policy and that mandating 
the application of any number of foreign laws could be contrary to the general 
policy of achieving “an economic and expeditious administration of the estate” 
on the basis of the assistance given.62 An argument based on comity was 
given short shrift as the judge was of the view that assistance alone did not 
imply that a foreign law was automatically imported as the means of providing 
such assistance unless the legislature expressly contemplated this would be 
the case, which here the judge did not think to be its intention. In the judge’s 
view, the application of local law, that he deems would have been applied, 
was entirely consistent with the principle of comity. Furthermore, the judge did 
not think that the views in Re Metzeler, where the American court stated that a 
                                                 
57 The example of Re Reserve International Liquidity Fund Limited (unreported) (1 April 2010) 
was proffered by the judge in explanation, where the British Virgin Islands court authorised 
the liquidators of a company to countermand instructions given by its directors for the 
movement of moneys it had on deposit and recover the company’s property for the purposes 
of the insolvency. 
58 Primeo GC, at paragraph 19. 
59 The judge was also mindful of the fact that his judgment was likely to be appealed. 
60 Primeo GC, at paragraph 20. 
61 Ibid., at paragraph 21. 
62 Ibid., at paragraph 22. 
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foreign trustee could only exercise those avoidance powers conferred under 
his home law, should bind the Cayman court in its interpretation of section 
221, no matter that arguments could be made that the provisions were 
comparable in origin.63 
 
In light of the rejection of the availability of the domestic assistance provision, 
the judge based his eventual granting of the necessary powers on the 
common law, agreeing with the judge in Re Phoenix. As such, the Cayman 
court held that it had the authority to entertain at common law an action based 
on the transaction avoidance provisions, whether in their 2007 or 2010 
incarnation.64 For the purpose of these claims, the court deemed the insolvent 
company to be treated as if it had been the subject of liquidation before the 
Cayman court, despite the fact that section 91(d) could not have been invoked 
to assert this jurisdiction.65 It is this part of the judgment that has been was 
stayed pending the outcome of the Privy Council hearing, with the Cayman 
Court of Appeal April 2014 judgment restricting itself to the issue of whether 
the domestic assistance provision had the impact the judge at first instance 
declared it to have. 
 
The Court of Appeal Judgment 
 
For both parties, the result was unsatisfactory. The trustee of the American 
bankruptcy clearly wanted the application of the foreign avoidance provisions, 
as they were procedurally advantageous to him, but was prepared to settle for 
the domestic provisions being extended on the basis of the statutory 
assistance mechanisms the judge below had said was not available. The 
fund, against whom an order had been rendered, disputed that the common 
law furnished the necessary powers the judge held were available, but was 
prepared to concede that, if those powers were available at common law, they 
should only be available where section 91 could be deployed to create a 
domestic winding up proceeding in respect of the insolvent entity.66 At the 
hearing in November 2013,67 the issues were summarised as being: (i) 
whether the court could use the domestic statute to extend deploy foreign 
transaction avoidance provisions; (ii) whether the domestic statute could be 
used to apply the domestic provisions to the same effect; and (iii) whether the 
common law could furnish the necessary powers and under what conditions.68 
Referring to the Bermudian appeal and the fact it would impact on the third 
issue, the court noted that it had been invited to deliver an interim judgment 
addressing only the first two issues.69 After setting out the relevant provisions 
and recounting in some detail the process by which the judge below had 
                                                 
63 Ibid., at paragraphs 23-26. 
64 Ibid., at paragraph 34. 
65 Ibid., at paragraph 35. 
66 Appeals no. CICA 1/2013 and CICA 2/2013 (“Primeo CA”), at paragraphs 9-10. The 
preceding paragraphs introduce the appeal, iterate the facts, preliminary issues and outcome 
of the hearing below. 
67 Coram Sir John Chadwick P, Motley JA and Campbell JA. 
68 Primeo CA, at paragraph 11. 
69 Ibid., at paragraph 12. 
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arrived at his conclusion,70 the court turns to its own assessment of the 
domestic rules. With the text of section 304 in mind,71 the court’s view is that it 
is appropriate for it to dissect the issues in the same way the trial judge did, 
first to determine whether the domestic statute authorises the deployment of 
any transaction avoidance provisions in aid of foreign proceedings and, 
secondly, it being the case, whether the applicable law of those provisions is 
foreign or domestic.72 
 
(i) Deploying The Transaction Avoidance Provision 
 
Starting with the first issue, authority for the deployment of transaction 
avoidance provision, the court sets out the rival contentions of the parties.73 
The trustee’s submissions are six-fold: (i) paragraphs (a) to (e) of section 241 
do not constitute an exhaustive list of the court’s powers, but rather the 
section enables the court to make any orders ancillary to a foreign proceeding 
for the purposes of achieving the objectives they contain; (ii) section 241 can 
be construed in the same way as its legislative model, section 304; (iii) in that 
light, the word “turnover” it adopts should, as a technical term in United States 
law, be given the same meaning as in the jurisprudence, to wit including 
transaction avoidance claims, the risk otherwise being to create material 
differences between two provisions with a common ancestry and cause 
confusion amongst practitioners familiar with the American model; (iv) given 
the source of the provision, the judge below erred in giving the term “property 
belonging to a debtor” a meaning consonant, not with United States law, 
where a related term appears in section 304 (as “property of the estate”), but 
with English law; (v) in that light, the meaning the judge gives, which has the 
effect of determining that property recovered by transaction avoidance cannot 
fall within the term “property of the debtor” as used in section 241, thus 
excluding those types of action from its scope, also risks creating a difference; 
and, as a summary, (vi) sections 241-242 are clearly connected with 
transaction avoidance and the court has the power to make the necessary 
ancillary orders to permit proceedings with the result of making the recovered 
property “property of a debtor” as envisaged in the sections.74 
 
Summarising the arguments on the fund’s behalf, the court states these to be 
five-fold: (i) sections 241-242, in the way they are cast as provisions within 
Part XVII, reflect the common law rule that a court can only recognise the 
authority of an office-holder appointed under the law of the place of 
incorporation in respect of a proceeding opened there; (ii) paragraphs (a) to 
(e) of section 241 are an exhaustive statement of the orders a court may 
grant, there being no provision comparable to section 304(b)(3) that enables 
the granting of “other appropriate relief”, and, thus, the section cannot be 
construed to enable the granting of other forms of ancillary relief, even in 
circumstances that might lead to the fulfilment of one of the purposes 
                                                 
70 Ibid., at paragraphs 13-35, essentially repeating the reasoning in Primeo GC, at paragraphs 
10-25 (detailed above). 
71 Ibid., at paragraph 37. 
72 Ibid., at paragraph 36. 
73 Ibid., at paragraph 38. 
74 Ibid., at paragraph 39. 
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mentioned in those paragraphs; (iii) the guidance in section 242 does not 
extend to enabling ancillary orders in circumstances section 241 does not 
expressly authorise, the language also incidentally speaking of “prevention”, 
rather than “reversal”, a reading supported by the way section 241 provisions 
can be deployed to “prevent” such dispositions through recognition of title 
and/or orders for the production and examination of documents; (iv) the term 
“turnover” cannot be read in the way the trustee wishes, the fund’s view being 
that the legislature, if intending to confer powers to support transaction 
avoidance proceedings, would have done so expressly; and, finally, (v) the 
legislature’s use of the terms “property belonging to the debtor” and “property 
of the company” connotes a distinction between the terms chosen in the 
statute, making the use of the former term in the section highly relevant and, 
as a result, not susceptible of the interpretation the trustee wishes to place on 
it.75 
 
In light of the arguments, the court naturally views the common ground 
between the parties as resting on the specific interpretation of sections 241-
242 and whether they collectively support the application of transaction 
avoidance provisions. It thus expresses the need to apply the principles of 
statutory construction in force in the Cayman Islands, giving its views 
relatively succinctly.76 The court is of the opinion that section 241, as the 
judge below had also held, did not confer a general power to make orders 
ancillary to a foreign proceeding at its discretion. The issue was therefore 
whether a power to make transaction avoidance orders was a power that 
could be exercised for one or more of the purposes section 241 contained, 
there being no power to order “other appropriate relief”, unlike in the section 
304 model on which section 241 was based.77 For the court, though, the 
guidance in section 242, which specifies matters the court is to take into 
account for the purpose of exercising the powers in section 241, makes 
explicit reference to “the prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of 
property” (paragraph (c)). Although this does not add to the range of orders 
that may be given under section 241, the inclusion of the mention appears to 
be sufficient evidence of the legislature’s intention that orders made with the 
purposes of section 241 in mind could include orders having such a 
preventative effect.78 
 
Furthermore, the guidance in paragraph (c) must be taken as guidance for the 
making of orders achieving any of the purposes in section 241, not just the 
ones put forward by the fund (recognition of title and/or production and 
examination of documents). In that light, an order for turnover of the debtor’s 
property to a foreign office-holder could be made for the purposes of “the 
prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property”.79 An order 
authorising the bringing of a transaction avoidance claim would have the 
effect of restoring property to the debtor’s estate, which the court could order 
                                                 
75 Ibid., at paragraph 40. 
76 Ibid., at paragraph 41. 
77 Ibid., at paragraph 42. 
78 Ibid., at paragraph 43. 
79 Ibid., at paragraph 44. 
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to be turned over to the foreign office-holder.80 The distinction between the 
terms “property belonging to a debtor” and “property comprised in the debtor’s 
estate” used variously in sections 241-242 can be understood, the avoidance 
of dispositions of property in the debtor’s estate having simply the effect of 
restoring to the debtor property belonging to him and which will, because of 
the insolvency order, be within the estate for the purposes of distribution and, 
as in the instant case, for the purposes of turnover prior to such a 
distribution.81 The court is able to do this, it says, without needing to rely on 
the definitions and interpretations as developed within United States 
jurisprudence with respect to section 304, giving a “true construction” of 
sections 241-242 in accordance uniquely with the precepts of local law.82 
Summarising its view, the court holds simply that it has jurisdiction to apply 
transaction avoidance provisions in aid of foreign proceedings.83 
 
(ii) The Applicable Law: Foreign or Domestic? 
 
Turning to the second issue, the court focuses on the nature of the applicable 
law, beginning with the arguments presented by the parties.84 Here the 
arguments for the trustee are quite complex with essentially six points: (i) the 
judge below erred in holding that to assist a foreign procedure by the making 
of ancillary orders does not require the application of a law, in the instance a 
foreign law, that would be more than just incidental to the determination within 
foreign proceedings of what constituted the estate and what antecedent 
transactions required reversal so as to reconstitute it; (ii) since what is within 
the estate is a matter of foreign law, the judge should have held that section 
242 required at the very least the option to choose and/or to apply the foreign 
law; (iii) similarly, the principle of comity, excluded by the judge below from 
having that effect, should also be treated as permitting the choice and/or 
application of foreign law; (iv) the limitation in section 241(2) to orders only 
against the debtor or relevant parties85 would not make sense unless the 
legislature intended, as a possibility, for courts to be able to apply foreign law, 
with the limitation reflecting the boundaries to this application; (v) the principle 
of modified universalism, also rejected by the judge below, would require 
section 241 to be interpreted so as to be able to apply foreign law, given the 
desirability that avoidance actions be governed by the lex concursus; and 
(finally) (vi) other principles such as “fairness, equity and equality” also 
militated for the like treatment of creditors through the application of the same 
rules of substantive law to them, such as in the case of preferences.86 Almost 
as an aside, the trustee conceded in the alternative that section 241 could 
also confer a power to apply local law, thus reinforcing the position at 
common law the judge below held gave such a power.87 
                                                 
80 Ibid., at paragraph 45. 
81 Ibid., at paragraph 46. 
82 Ibid., at paragraph 47. 
83 Ibid., at paragraph 48. 
84 Ibid., at paragraph 49. 
85 As defined in section 103, which imposes a duty of cooperation with a company’s liquidator 
on, inter alia, persons responsible for promotion, management or liquidation of the company 
as well as professional service providers. 
86 Primeo CA, at paragraph 50. 
87 Ibid., at paragraph 51. 
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The arguments put on behalf of the fund are similarly complex and can be 
resumed in seven points: (i) the power to apply foreign law is so significant a 
power to give to a court it might be reasonably expected a legislature would 
only do so expressly;88 (ii) section 241 is not a recognition section, though 
with power for the court to grant relief in aid of foreign proceedings, thus 
militating against arguments that the application of foreign law to avoidance 
transaction situations is a necessary corollary of the recognition of foreign 
proceedings; (iii) comity cannot of itself supply the necessary authority for 
giving effect to foreign law; (iv) similarly, the incidental limitation in section 
241(2) is not to buttress, albeit place parameters on, the application of foreign 
law, but simply to ensure that the same persons are subject to section 241 as 
are mentioned in section 103; (v) modified universalism cannot of itself supply 
grounds for the recognition of the application of foreign law as a substitute for 
the type of unity and universality that can only be achieved through treaty; (vi) 
further, other principles cited by the trustee do not lend themselves to any 
interpretation requiring imperatively the application of foreign law; and, finally, 
(vii) section 241 should not be interpreted in light of the United States 
provision that is section 304 without there being the clearest statement that 
this is intended to be so. The domestic provision has differences, witness the 
exclusion of the power to order “other appropriate relief”, suggesting that this 
is now a local provision that has to be interpreted consonant with local 
principles and as part of the autochthonous Companies Law.89 
 
When it comes, the court’s view is admirably succinct. It does not, as 
expressed earlier in relation to the first issue, think it appropriate to construe 
sections 241-242 by reference to the United States text or jurisprudence.90 It 
considers, in agreement with the fund, that the application of foreign law is a 
radical departure that would need to be authorised expressly, which is not the 
case. This is so, notwithstanding that this would lead to the result that the 
transaction avoidance rules are governed by a different law to that of the 
procedure and distribution regime the rules are intended to support. The fact 
that companies may not be registered under the law is also not an argument 
sufficiently compelling for the application of foreign law to them and would 
result in quite different treatment to those circumstances in which the court 
was able to use section 91 to wind such companies up.91 As such, the court 
clearly holds it does not have the power to apply foreign law pursuant to 
orders made under sections 241-242.92 
 
Analysis and Impact 
 
                                                 
88 Some support for this point may be seen in the express statement in the United Kingdom’s section 
426(5), which allows the court to apply both domestic and foreign law to matters before it, though 
subject to considerations of private international law. 
89 Primeo CA, at paragraph 52. 
90 Ibid., at paragraph 53. 
91 Ibid., at paragraph 54. 
92 Ibid., at paragraph 55. Paragraphs 56-59 simply summarise the parties’ essential arguments in 
relation to the preliminary findings and the court’s own findings. 
 15 
This is most certainly an interesting outcome in what has been a by-product of 
the “active assistance” saga and complex tale of the influence of Cambridge 
Gas. It also incidentally illustrates a problem with the unvarnished use of legal 
transplants without great care taken to decide what of their context can be 
legitimately imported. In this case, the judges have stepped up to the plate 
and determined the extent of the influence that section 304 might trace on the 
development of sections 241-242. Indeed, the court in the Cayman Islands 
has held that its domestic assistance provision can be deployed to provide the 
help that is sought, although it can only do so using domestic law. This is a 
position the judge below reached using the common law as his springboard. 
In correcting the misapprehension of the judge below who assumed the 
statutory provisions did not have the same effect, the court adds to the 
panoply of instruments that may be used. Will Could it, however, also decide 
that the common law can should continue to be so used, where the domestic 
statute has already provided? This is was certainly the desire evident in Re 
Phoenix, where the judge expressed her hope that the common law and any 
statutory provisions should develop in parallel to achieve the same ends.  
 
In the end, though, it will depend on what the Privy Council emitted a very 
cautious view in the Bermudian appeal, stating that, while the common law 
should evolve tools to assist in instances of cross-border insolvency, judges 
should be careful not to trespass on the prerogatives of the legislature by 
fashioning rules beyond their permissible constitutional role as interpreters of 
the law. As such, judges should be cautious in seeking to create rules except 
where there was a sound and pragmatic need for intervention to assist the 
management of cases with an international element.will say. Given that the 
composition of the bench hearing the further appeal in the Bermudian case 
overlappeds significantly with that of the Supreme Court in Rubin, where 
Cambridge Gas was determined to be wrong, the wise may be betting on an 
unfavourable result was always on the cards. The future is, for the moment 
however, still open and sufficiently unpredictable.However, The Privy Council, 
in the person of Lord Collins, went further to make reference expressly to the 
Caymans case and to hold that the approach of the judge at first instance was 
wrong.93 It seems as if the answer is now certain and the Court of Appeal 




In summary, judicial creativity continues to occur of necessity in a number of 
jurisdictions across the common law world, particularly those where domestic 
cross-border mechanisms may not exist or may be deficient or, as in the 
present case, require determination as to their meaning and extent. The 
facility given to judges of the common law courts to do so means that their 
views can assist or hinder the development of efforts to assist the 
organisation and management of cross-border instances. Though the judges 
are quite wary of trespassing on the prerogative of the legislature and would, 
undoubtedly, prefer it if the legislature developed the tools necessary for 
cross-border assistance, nonetheless, their views are a vital part of the overall 
                                                 
93 Re SaadSingularis PC, above note 37, at paragraph 102. 
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process of development. In some instances, the attempts by judges to push 
the law further are later rejected, in others they are successful. In time, these 
more forward views may be adopted elsewhere, illustrating the incremental 
approach to the construction of the common law across the members of the 
common law family through persuasive precedent. In this, the guidance of the 
higher courts is vital to ensuring the common law does not stagnate and that a 
firm and principled approach serves as the precept to guide its continued 
development. While the Privy Council appears to have brought an end to one 
series of developments, it is by no means certain that this will be the end of 
the story. 
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